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1 
THE NEW CHALLENGES TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: 
LEGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WTO TREATY ON 
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
 
Jonathan Curci* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The patentability of biotechnology took off after the United 
States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.1 By acknowledging that statutorily patentable subject 
matter included “anything under the sun that is made by man,” the 
Court encompassed both foreseeable and unforeseeable subject 
matter. This Diamond standard encompassed the inventive work of 
biotechnology and gene sequences. Consequently, an “imitation 
effect” rippled from the U.S. to Europe and other jurisdictions, 
generating a series of legislative measures to patent living forms. 
In addition, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights2 (TRIPS) 
internationalized biotechnological practices and enabled genetic 
engineering to yield important breakthroughs in the new 
millennium.  
Breakthroughs in genetic modification have facilitated the 
development of thousands of novel organisms, deepening the 
controversy of patenting such subject matter. The myriad 
biotechnological applications3 released into the environment for 
 
 
* Lecturer, LL.M. Intellectual Property Program, World Intellectual Property 
Organization and University of Torino Law School, Italy; Ph.D. Candidate in 
International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland; 
LL.M. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
3 Biotechnology involves techniques for using the properties of living things to 
market products and services. These techniques include selecting natural strains of 
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pharmaceutical, agricultural, and medicinal purposes generate 
transnational concerns that pose an enormous challenge to national 
and international communities. In particular, developing countries 
denounce the patentability of biotechnology, which reduces the 
world’s genetic resources down to mere property rights, resulting 
in corporate control over access to food, medicinal technology, and 
other resources essential to mankind’s health and welfare. 
Moreover, patents on living forms raise also an economic concern 
since a significant difference exists between the economic impact 
caused by a monopoly right on inanimate subject matter and the 
economic impact caused by animate, or living, subject matter:  
 
[W]hile inanimate matter (which may be subject to 
patent protection), usually does not self-replicate 
(e.g., car brakes are not known to give life to 
subsequent generations of car brakes), the same 
principle does not hold true in the case of living 
matter, which on the contrary, tends to self-
replicate.4 
 
Additionally, potential transnational harm caused by genetic 
engineering may also arise through the destabilization of regional 
ecologies via genetic pollution and through an accelerated decline 
of biological diversity on a global scale. Thus, legal control over 
biodiversity is an issue of serious international consequence. 
This article analyzes the existing treaties that guide interaction 
between corporations from industrialized states and indigenous 
communities. Additionally, this article will predominantly focus 
on the benefit sharing problems that arise between States and 
private industries when intellectual property rights (IPRs) are 
                                                                                                          
organisms that carry desirable traits; making hybrids by fusing cells from different 
parental sources; using chemicals and radiation to create mutant strains; or genetically 
engineering plants, animals, and microorganisms to produce specific phenotypic 
characteristics. See generally Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 
October 1973, entry into force Oct. 7, 1977, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html. 
4 M. RICOLFI, Intellectual Property and Biodiversity: A Review of Legal and 
Conceptual Issues and of Policy Options, in ATTI DEL SEMINARIO 13–15 (2003). For a 
more thorough account of the protections recommended by the International Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, see G. GHIDINI & S. HASSAN, 
BIOTECNOLOGIE, NOVITÀ VEGETALI E BREVETTI (Giuffrè, Milano 1990). 
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exercised over genetic resources.5 Major industrialized countries, 
realizing the potential gains flowing from new technologies driven 
by private industries, promote the integration of stronger IPRs in 
multilateral and bilateral treaties that ultimately conflict with 
interests of developing countries. Most developing countries join 
as parties to these treaties despite the benefit sharing problems 
arising from the international exploitation of genetic resources. At 
the same time, however, developing countries accuse industrialized 
states of watering down the patentability requirements of 
biotechnology within their own national jurisdictions, effectively 
accommodating corporate interests without precise and careful 
consideration of the intrinsically complex and multifaceted issues 
or the consequences involved.  
Various international institutions, such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), are becoming increasingly 
involved with the production of guidelines and treaties on the 
matter. Currently, at least two multilateral treaties regulate the 
transnational behaviors in this field: the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and TRIPS. 
 
 
5 A vivid example of benefit sharing illustrates this area of concern. Imagine a 
plant, which produces a natural sweetener, preserved for several millennia in the 
interstices of a local farming micro-culture. This sweetener performs its sweetening 
function without dietary or health shortcomings. A bio-prospecting corporation 
secures samples of the local sweetening genetic resources, maps its genome, and then 
proceeds to genetically engineer a plant that yields sweetener with a ten-fold potency 
over the original. The corporation then patents the modified plant and the world 
quickly forgets the original plant as the patented plant is markedly more productive. 
Consequently, through commercialization, all of the profits flow to the company 
patent holder without a farthing to the indigenous farmers who preserved the plant for 
millennia. Some 6.5% of all genetic research undertaken in agriculture focuses on 
germ plasma derived by wild species and land races (farmer-developed varieties of 
crop plants that are adapted to local environmental conditions). Thus, the question is 
posed: Is it fair to entitle the entire pastry to the one who adds the final cherry to a pie? 
Marco Ricolfi, Biotechnology, Patents and Epistemic Approaches, J. BIOLAW & BUS., 
SPEC. SUPP., 77–90, (2002). See also THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
SYSTEM; COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1820, 1827 (F. Abbott, Thomas Cottier & F. 
Gurry eds., Kluwer Law Int. 1999); Thomas Cottier, The Protection of GRs and 
Traditional Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and Obligations in World 
Trade Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 555 (1998) (U.K.); Michael Blakeney, Presentation at 
the WIPO-Torino Law School Specialization Course in Intellectual Property, 
Intellectual Property Aspects of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, 2, (Nov. 22, 
2001).  
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These two treaties operate in manner that has generated much 
conflict and uncertainty. Indeed, portions of TRIPS clash with the 
concepts and principles provided by the CBD. Granting IPRs to 
modified, unauthorized appropriations of plant and animal genetic 
resources frustrates provider countries trying to implement the 
concepts and principles provided by the CBD of control over their 
genetic resources. The CBD is far more favorable to conservation 
of biodiversity and preservation of rights for developing countries 
while TRIPS is far more aggressive about facilitating biological 
patentability and promoting private ownership and exploitation of 
such resources. Nevertheless, the two aims are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.  
Accordingly, this article formulates interpretative suggestions 
to reconcile TRIPS and the CBD in a mutually supportive manner 
that increases the confidence of genetic resource provider 
countries through increased transparency in the intellectual 
property (IP) system. The following section discusses the scope 
and utility of Article 27 of TRIPS, explaining the major issues that 
arise in its interpretation. The next section outlines the legal debate 
on the articulation and compatibility of TRIPS and the CBD. The 
subsequent section then lays out an overview of the TRIPS 
Council solutions to amend the highly disputed Article 27.3(b) in a 
manner more compatible with the CBD’s transparency measures 
and its derivative law.  
This article concludes with a brief discussion on the diplomatic 
problems arising from the identification of the best possible treaty 
within the international patent system where the reconciliation 
between TRIPS and CBD provisions.  
 
II. THE SCOPE AND UTILITY OF ARTICLE 27 OF TRIPS 
 
Article 27 of TRIPS provides that, subject to certain conditions, 
patents in all fields of technology shall be available for any 
invention. TRIPS is the first globally adopted treaty to make the 
patenting of life legal by requiring WTO Member States to provide 
patent protection for all fields of technology. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 27 outline the inventions Member States may exclude from 
patent protection under specified conditions.  
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Article 27 of TRIPS states: 
 
Patentable Subject Matter  
 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, 
patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this 
Article, patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced. 
 
2. Members may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary 
to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely 
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods 
for the treatment of humans or animals;  
 
(b) plants and animals other than 
microorganisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals 
other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. However, Members shall provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof. 
 
This patent availability requirement has a few notable 
exceptions. First—particularly supported by the European States—
is the exclusion of inventions from patentability where it is 
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necessary to “protect ordre public . . . including . . . human, animal 
or plant life . . . to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.” As 
stated above in paragraph 3(b), members are also not required to 
grant patents on plants or animals. The prohibition of patents on 
plant and animal varieties contained in the European Patent 
Convention strongly influenced this phrasing.6 However, in the 
absence of international jurisprudence, the interpretation of this 
provision remains subject to domestic patent laws and other judicial 
bodies. Thus, while providing some exceptions, TRIPS allows 
Member States to provide patents or a sui generis system of 
protection over living organisms. 
Furthermore, Article 27 contains contentious provisions that 
underpin the new multilateral trade system. A literal interpretation 
of this provision identifies four possible options of implementation: 
(i) Member States can allow patents on any invention in 
biotechnology by not excluding plants, animals, and biological 
processes; (ii) Member States may exclude from patentability 
plants, animals, and biological processes, but not exclude new plant 
varieties; (iii) Member States may choose not to patent new plant 
varieties (i.e., to exclude new plant varieties from patentability and 
introduce a sui generis system, an IPR protection of its own kind 
supported by the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) for the protection of plant varieties); 
(iv) or Member States can also choose the U.S.-like solution of a 
double protection system of not excluding new plant varieties from 
patentability and simultaneously enjoying sui generis–UPOV 
protection. It therefore appears that TRIPS obliges Member States 
to provide some kind of IPR protection on almost all life forms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 See also Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 47 (2001). See generally the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, EPO 
O.J. 6 (1977), for examples of provisions in the European Patent Office similar to 
those in the TRIPS and for a discussion on the complexity of the interpretation of 
patent provisions relating to genetically engineered plants and animals. 
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The table below illustrates the patentability subject matter of 
Article 27.3(b):7 
 
WTO members must provide 
protection for: 
WTO members may  
exclude from patent 
protection: 
Microorganisms Plants 
Non-biological processes Animals 
Microbiological processes Essentially biological 
processes for the 
production of plants or 
animals 
Plant varieties* (by an IPR system 
that may be patents, a sui generis 
alternative, or a combination thereof) 
Plant varieties* 
 
* Plant varieties are defined and protected through the 1991 Act of the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants if the plant 
variety is novel, distinct from other varieties of the same species, and uniform and 
stable when grown or propagated. Unlike the requirements to receive a patent, the 
conditions of protection depend on the distinctness (from senior varieties), 
uniformity (within the same generation), and stability (across generations) of the 
genome of the variety obtained through breeding. The right differs from that of a 
patent since it is weaker in its exclusive limitations. 
 
Although TRIPS allows countries to exclude life forms such as 
plants and animals from patentability, a closer look at Article 
27.3(b) reveals that all countries must provide patent protection on 
microorganisms, non-biological, and microbiological processes.8 A 
distinct disconnect exists between the patentable subject matter in 
Article 27.3(b) and life forms that may be excluded from patent 
protection because the former has no commonly accepted definition 
in international patent law. Even the patent systems that have a 
 
 
7 See Graham Dutfield, Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity: Is There a Role for 
the Patent System?, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 899 (2002). 
8 A microorganism is an organism that can be seen only under a microscope, 
usually, an ordinary light microscope. They are typically of the order of microns 
(millionths of a meter) or tens of microns in linear dimensions, and include bacteria, 
micro-plasm, yeasts, single-celled algae, and protozoa. Multicellular organisms are 
normally not included, nor fungi apart from yeasts. Viruses are also not automatically 
included; many scientists do not classify them as organisms as they depend on cells to 
multiply. See Kimball Nill, Glossary of Biotechnology Terms, http://biotech 
terms.org/sourcebook/index.phtml.  
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rather well established tradition of patenting biotechnological 
inventions (U.S., Europe, and Japan) differ in their interpretation of 
the patentability of such subject matter. Depending on a patent 
system’s definition, a system may consider a plant cell a 
microorganism even though it can grow into an entire tree. A patent 
on such a cell9 could extend to trees even if one cannot patent a 
plant variety. Notably even in scientific practice, the term 
“microorganism” is inherently flawed since scientific classification 
continually evolves.10 
Consequently, the language of this provision opens it to wide 
interpretation. Most developing countries are not sure how TRIPS 
distinguishes plants, animals, and microorganisms that require 
patents; they also question why essentially biological processes11 do 
not require patents while microbiological12 and non-biological 
processes do. After all, a microbiological process is essentially a 
biological process. Indeed, microbiological processes merely utilize 
an engineered gene13 to modify a biological product. Moreover, 
 
 
9 A cell line is a supposedly genetically uniform population of cells derived from 
one individual, or possibly a clone (theoretically genetically identical descendants) of 
one original cell. The genetic identity of all the cells is a fiction, as the genetic 
material is subject to many 'fluid genome' processes that constantly make cells 
genetically different from one another. A genome is the totality of all the genetic 
material (deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA) in an organism that organizes in a precise 
way, though by no means fixed or constant. In the case of viruses, most of them will 
have ribonucleic acid or RNA as the genetic material. See Nill, supra note 8. 
10 For the debate occurring in Europe on the patentable subject matter, see Mike 
Adcock & Margaret Llewelyn, Microorganisms, Definition and Options under TRIPS, 
Occasional Paper 2 (Nov. 23, 2000) (discussing the reluctance of the European Patent 
Office (EPO) to introduce a fixed definition because “it does not seem expedient to 
introduce such a definition as the rapid evolution in the field of microbiology would 
necessitate its frequent updating”). 
11 An “essentially biological process” is a scientifically suspect term. Does it 
mean a process that occurs naturally or one carried out by organisms? Similarly, a 
“non-biological process” is difficult to define because all processes in biotechnology, 
by definition, are biological. Some argue that it describes a process that does not occur 
naturally or not normally carried out by organisms. See Nill, supra note 8. 
12 Microbiology is the science dealing with the structure, classification, 
physiology, and distribution of microorganisms, and with their technical and medical 
significance. See id. Thus, a “micro-biological process” is presumably a process 
carried out by microorganisms. 
13 A gene is a stretch of genetic material (DNA or RNA) with a defined function 
in the organism or cell. It usually codes for a protein. A genome contains many genes. 
For example, the human genome contains approximately 100,000 genes. A DNA 
sequence refers to the sequence of bases in a stretch of DNA, a linear molecule 
consisting of units strung together. There are four different units, each identified by the 
specific base contained, and four different bases, represented by the letters, A, T, C, 
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more often than not, the resulting product is new, involves an 
inventive step, and is capable of industrial application.14 It is 
therefore a patentable invention under Article 27. Thus, even 
though microbiological processes utilize genes, the foundation for 
all life, Article 27 only excludes “plants and animals other than 
microorganisms,” and genes are not whole organisms. Rather, they 
are microorganisms.15 Nevertheless, States may either argue that 
genes are not microorganisms since they are unicellular organisms 
capable of propagation or they may invoke ordre public or morality 
exceptions to deny IPRs. One can only wonder whether TRIPS 
justifies such a denial when, for example, a company uses a gene to 
create a vitamin-enriched food product and the State holds no 
scientific basis for regarding the gene or the food product as 
harmful to human health or the environment.  
Evidently, TRIPS resulted from a painstaking negotiation on a 
wide number of IP issues. It cannot provide precise guidance but it 
certainly influences the attitude of certain States towards 
transnational biotechnology corporations.  
 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON THE CBD 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
This section discusses some of the alleged fundamental legal 
and political conflicts arising from the implementation of TRIPS 
Article 27 in light of the obligations that States have with regard to 
the CBD. 
 
A. Principles of the CBD 
 
The Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
aims to set up an international framework for the preservation and 
utilization of the world’s biological resources. The CBD is the 
result of prolonged, international pressure to respond to the 
destruction of, and unequal profits from, the biodiversity of the 
southern hemisphere. After years of debate, the United Nations 
                                                                                                          
and G. An example of a DNA sequence is ATTTCCGCTACGCGTTA. An RNA 
sequence is similar, except that the letter “U” replaces the letter T. See id. 
14 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27(1). 
15 DAN LESKIEN & MICHAEL FLITNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES: OPTIONS FOR A SUI GENERIS SYSTEM 18–22 (Int'l Plant 
Genetic Resources Inst., Issues in Genetic Resources No. 6, 1997). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW           VOLUME 2 
 
 10
agreed upon the CBD in 1992.16 It came into force in 1993, and 
today 188 States have ratified it.17  
There exists a well-established principle of international law: 
That States have a sovereign right over their territory, including the 
natural resources contained therein. Before the CBD codified this 
principle, most States affirmed it in their constitutions,18 typically 
stating that the State owns all “flora and fauna” and that all other 
natural resources, with the exception of agricultural lands, shall not 
be alienated. If States allow IPRs over flora or fauna, this may 
result in a form of alienation because IPRs by their nature are 
exclusive monopoly rights that prevent others from producing the 
patented flora or fauna. Before the CBD’s adoption, many 
questioned whether biological resources were under a regime of the 
“heritage of mankind,” or whether States’ lacked the ability to 
exercise sovereignty over biological resources and subject genetic 
resources to private property rights.19 The shift to the ideas 
purported by the CBD came from an increasing commercial interest 
in biological and genetic resources and a desire to subject such 
resources to private property claims, namely intellectual property. 
Much of the movement came in the form of plant breeders’ rights 
and patents, which give their owners an exclusive right to control 
any commercial use of these resources.20  
Amidst the global pressure to privatize biological resources, the 
CBD stands as an important watershed in international efforts to 
promote biodiversity conservation. For instance, the Convention 
binds signatories to a number of basic principles regarding how, by 
 
 
16 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro), June 5, 1992, pmbl., 31 
I.L.M. 822 (1992), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf. 
17 Id.  
18 See, e.g., 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES art. XII, § 2 
(“all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral 
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and 
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.”); see also CONSTITUCIÓN 
DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 124 (prohibiting the registration of 
patents over genetic resources).  
19 Christopher Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986). 
20 See Barbara Laine Kagedan, The Biodiversity Convention, Intellectual 
Property Rights, and Ownership of Genetic Resources: International Developments, 
prepared for Industry Canada, Intellectual Property Policy Directorate (Jan. 1996); 
WALTER V. REID ET AL., A New Lease on Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING 
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1–52 (1993). 
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whom, and for whose benefit biodiversity must be conserved.21 
Article 1 of the CBD states its overall objectives. These objectives 
include first, the “conservation of biological diversity;” second, the 
sustainable use of biological diversity components; and finally, the 
“fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources.”22 CBD recognizes the sovereign 
rights of States over their biological resources in Articles 3 through 
15.23 Article 3 recognizes that, “States have . . . the sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources,” including, under Article 2, 
biological and genetic resources of actual or potential value.24 
Article 8(j) requires Contracting States to: 
 
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider 
application with the approval and involvement of 
the holders of such knowledge, innovations and 
practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices (emphasis 
added).25 
 
Article 15 specifically discusses the details of regulating access 
to genetic resources through increased transparency in patent 
application. The first paragraph gives States sovereign rights over 
their resources and confers on them the “authority to determine 
access to [their] genetic resources.”26 Paragraph 4 allows access to 
genetic resources, subject to “mutually agreed terms,” while 
paragraph 5 specifies that the same access “shall be subject to prior 
informed consent [PIC] of the Contracting Party providing such 
 
 
21 For an in-depth study of the preparatory works of the CBD see Fiona 
McConnell, BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION—A NEGOTIATING HISTORY: A PERSONAL 
ACCOUNT OF NEGOTIATING THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, AND AFTER (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1996). 
22 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 823. 
23 Id. at 824–29. 
24 Id. at 823–25.  
25 Id. at 826. 
26 Id. at 828. 
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resources.”27 Moreover, Article 15 specifies that the transfer of 
technology is an invaluable instrument for the effective 
implementation of the CBD.28  
As noted above, Article 15 lists a set of rights conferred on 
provider States. However, the CBD also provides symmetric 
obligations on the recipient State. For instance, paragraph 7 of 
Article 15 provides that each contracting party:  
 
shall take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with 
Articles 16 and 19 . . . with the aim of sharing in a 
fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the 
commercial and other utilization of genetic 
resources with the Contracting party providing such 
resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually 
agreed terms (emphasis added).29 
 
This provision establishes access to the biological resources of 
developing countries on a quid pro quo basis with a transfer of 
technology from the industrialized countries.  
Finally, paragraph 5 of Article 16 asserts that IPRs must not 
conflict with the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.30 
Therefore, the CBD not only gives rights to provider States, but 
also regulates the transfer and interaction between provider and 
recipient States.  
It is the task of each State and the international community as a 
whole to interpret the aforementioned CBD principles in a manner 
harmonious with Article 27 of TRIPS. After identifying the major 
areas of tension between the two legal instruments, the following 
sections intend to set forth guidelines to achieve mutual 
supportiveness.31 The following sections intend to contribute to the 
achievement of this objective. 
 
 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 829.  
31 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.3(c), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 for the concept of mutual supportiveness in the interpretation of 
treaties, according to which a treaty has to be interpreted in light of all the other rules 
of treaties and general law applicable to the parties. International judicial organs more 
and more frequently adopt this approach in order to avoid the creation of self-
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B. General Considerations on the Legal Relations Between TRIPS 
and the CBD Obligations 
 
While WTO Member States incorporate TRIPS within their 
national laws, access to genetic resources—from which genetically 
engineered products are developed—is becoming one of the most 
critical areas of debate between industrialized and developing 
countries.  
Many developing countries regard the relationship between 
TRIPS and the CBD as one of opposing principles. On one side 
stands the principle of economic growth purported by the TRIPS 
Agreement. On the other side is the principle of sustainable 
development served by the CBD. Industrialized countries justify 
globalizing and harmonizing IPRs because such rights will 
strengthen the supply of innovation to the market. They argue that 
economic growth will result from improving dynamic efficiency 
through stronger IPRs. Pushing markets towards the high 
“technology fix,” however, stands in stark contrast to the kind of 
economy advocated by committed environmentalists who believe 
that States should subject development to environmental costs and 
implications. 
Most of the conflict between TRIPS and the CBD is spurred by 
moral and rhetorical assumptions. One assumption claims that the 
patent regime is a Western form of IPR, which is totally unsuitable 
to the majority of the societies in the South that have accepted 
TRIPS by acceding to the WTO. Another assumption asserts that 
private rights are completely alien to indigenous communities 
because the vast majority of their farmers, who manage biodiversity 
at the local level, are accustomed to collective rights.  
The CBD intends to strengthen developing countries' capacities 
to conserve and use biological diversity on a long-term basis by 
reserving all rights over those resources for the developing 
countries and by including the right to enjoy the benefits of their 
                                                                                                          
contained, international legal systems totally independent from general norms and 
from each other. See also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 751 (2002) [hereinafter 
Ministerial Declaration] for the concept of mutual supportiveness that has been 
particularly useful to reconcile international environmental and trade regimes. 
According to this concept, all of the applicable rules treat the parties on the same level. 
This rule of interpretation is important, especially in light of the rapid advancement of 
international norms both in the field of environment (e.g., CBD) and trade (e.g., 
TRIPS).  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW           VOLUME 2 
 
 14
resource base. Southern hemisphere countries feel consistently 
exploited because of the structural imbalances between countries 
rich in biological diversity and those strong in technological and 
legal instrumentation. 
Conversely, TRIPS intends to provide private property rights 
over products and processes whether biodiversity based or not. The 
pressure of certain non-State actor interests, namely those of 
multinational companies, has overwhelmingly helped achieve 
TRIPS’ intended results. 
While describing these apparent points of conflict, it is 
important to remember that contracting parties to the CBD have an 
obligation to cooperate and ensure that IPRs are “supportive of and 
do not run counter to [the CBD's] objectives.”32 Moreover, Article 
22 of the CBD states that its provisions will not affect countries’ 
rights and obligations to “any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would 
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.”33 This 
harmonization process is mainly “subject to national legislation and 
international law” and stands as a basis for countering the runaway 
march of the IPR regimes.34  
When a conflict exists between two treaties dealing with the 
same subject matter, the applicable rule is lex posterior derogat lex 
anterior (the latter law prevails over the first), which Article 30 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enshrines.35 In this 
case, TRIPS will prevail since it came into force after the CBD. 
However, if evaluated under prima facie evidence and by a stricto 
sensu legal point of view, the subject matter of the CBD and TRIPS 
basically differ; therefore, States should fully and simultaneously 
implement both of them. For instance, although both Article 27 of 
TRIPS and some of the provisions of the CBD deal with the 
utilization of biological resources, they do so to achieve two 
different objectives that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.36 
Although TRIPS subject matter does not does not suffer from 
an identity problem per se, some provisions regulate the same 
object and have the same purpose as CBD provisions. In order to 
 
 
32 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 829.  
33 Id. at 832.  
34 Id. at 829.  
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 30. 
36 Christina Noiville, Biodiversité et Propriété Intellectuelle. L'impossible 
Conciliation?, in BIODIVERSITE ET APPROPRIATION: LES DROITS DE PROPRIETE EN 
QUESTION (Elsevier, 2002). 
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fully apply and universally ratify both treaties, certain provisions 
contained in both treaties need to come into harmonization. 
Maljean-Dubois defines the controversial relationship between 
these two international instruments as an apparent conflict (namely 
an emboîtement or désarticulation) rather than an incompatibility; 
he posits that a relationship of complementarity has yet to 
develop.37 Such complementarity, however, can be realized through 
adequate interpretation of all the obligations at stake and further 
legislative work, harmonizing the two treaties for the benefit of the 
international community. 
In spite of the politically fundamental contradictions that seem 
to exist between CBD and TRIPS, legally speaking, inconsistencies 
between IPRs applied to life forms under TRIPS and the 
obligations of CBD are multifaceted. The inconsistencies 
particularly reveal themselves in the following fields: the access to 
and fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of 
genetic resources, the respect for traditional knowledge held by the 
indigenous communities, and the transfer of technology.  
 
1. Further considerations on the impact of TRIPS and the definition 
of biopiracy 
 
The alleged inconsistencies between TRIPS and the CBD reside 
at the schematic crossroad between the opposing perspectives of 
North and South. The debate over IPRs on biological resources and 
international trade is embedded in a broad context with so many 
intertwined aspects and competing interests that even choosing the 
study approach becomes confusing. Furthermore, this complex 
debate intensifies by classifying the opposition between the North 
and South as the opposition between the “haves” and the “have-
nots.”38 From a more optimistic perspective, one can find a viable 
solution that could potentially resolve the North-South conflict by 
acknowledging that while industrialized countries possess advanced 
technological manufacturing capabilities, developing countries 
possess the biological diversity lacking in the industrialized 
countries. 
 
 
37 Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, Biodiversité, Biotechnologies, Biosécurité: Le Droit 
International Désarticulé, 127(4) J. DU DROIT INT’L 966–67 (2000).  
38 Jean-Faustin Badimboli Atibasay, The International Legal Regime for 
Biotechnology Patenting: An Appraisal from the Standpoint of Developing Countires, 
31 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 291–325 (2001). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW           VOLUME 2 
 
 16
The private property regime established by TRIPS may 
undermine the implementation of the benefit-sharing provisions of 
the CBD that require the knowledge or material holder’s prior 
informed consent (PIC) for the use of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.39 TRIPS does not require the transparency of 
PIC and is therefore inconsistent with the CBD in that regard. 
Without such a PIC obligation in TRIPS, private entities from 
countries (generally industrialized ones) that use genetic resources 
in innovative processes will limit their efforts to seek and exploit 
benefit sharing with the countries of origin (generally developing 
ones). According to developing countries, leaving the negotiation of 
benefit sharing and PIC to contractual freedom (between private 
entities and provider countries) is unlikely to ensure compliance 
with CBD obligations. 
The aim of TRIPS, to homogenize national IP regimes, may 
jeopardize a country's freedom to choose the way it wants to deal 
with the use and protection of biodiversity and the related 
traditional knowledge. This issue blatantly arises when firms 
appropriate genes from a State that manipulates and sells the 
genetically modified product rather than from the State that patents 
the original product. Following the imposition of IPRs on life forms 
and related knowledge, communities of developing countries have 
risen against this kind of “piracy” of indigenous and local 
community knowledge.40 
The well-known phenomenon of “bioimperialism”41 or 
“biopiracy” defines the way in which industrialized countries 
“conquer” biological resources illegitimately. Industrialized 
countries accused developing countries of pursuing “intellectual 
piracy,” and after the adoption of TRIPS, developing countries 
 
 
39 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16. 
40 See, e.g., Press Release, RAFI, Enola Bean Patent Challenged (Jan. 5, 2001), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/news_enolabean.pdf (discussing the recent Enola 
bean case involving yellow beans from Mexico, which POD-NERS, Plc patented in 
the United States (U.S. Patent No. 5,984,479). POD-NERS, Plc used the patent to 
bring legal suits against two companies that sold the Mexican yellow beans in the 
U.S., claiming that the beans infringed its patent monopoly). 
41 Ketih Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the 
(Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998) (discussing questions raised about the emerging 
globalized vision of IPR protection embedded in multilateral agreements such as 
TRIPS, outlining how the international political economy of intellectual property 
protection should be addressed, and constructing and maintaining an intellectual 
public domain or commons).  
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accused industrialized countries of “biopiracy.” Developing 
countries coined this term as part of a counterattack strategy to 
describe the misappropriation of genetic resources by private 
entities in the North. These developing countries felt they were 
hardly as piratical as corporations that acquire resources and 
traditional knowledge from their countries and use them in their 
research and development programs by acquiring patents and other 
IPRs without compensating the provider countries and 
communities.42 However, such anti-biopiracy rhetoric did little to 
prevent the legalization of this “conquest.” Through TRIPS, the 
South has an obligation to grant patents, trademarks, and trade 
secrets without any compensation to the local communities that 
preserved and bred biological resources.43  
For all these reasons, the argument arises that IPRs can prevent 
countries from realizing the full and practical meaning of the CBD 
articles regarding national sovereignty over their natural resources 
and the rights of their local and indigenous communities.44 This 
prevention frustrates the ultimate goal of fairly distributing the 
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources situated in the 
contracting parties’ territories.45 
 
 
 
 
42 See Pat Mooney, Why We Call It Biopiracy, RESPONDING TO BIOPROSPECTING: 
FROM BIODIVERSITY IN THE SOUTH TO MEDICINES IN THE NORTH 37–43 (H. Svarstad & 
S.S. Dhillion eds., 2000). 
43 See Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and Obligations in World Trade Law, 1 J. 
INT’L ECONOMIC LAW 555 (1998) (stating that all this is done knowing that some 90% 
of genetic information and traditional knowledge are found in developing countries).  
44 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 825–26. Due to the 
importance of Article 8(j) and other related provisions, several workshops have been 
organized to advance their implementation. See, e.g., WIPO Report on Fact-Finding 
Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge, Geneva, Switz., Apr., 
2001, Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge 
Holders, 50.  
45 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 828, 830 (CBD 
Articles 1, 15.7, and 19.2 present the relevant provisions on benefit sharing relating to 
the conservation of traditional knowledge and the conservation of biodiversity 
contained in Articles 8(j) and 10(c)). For some socio-economic consideration, see K.A. 
Goldman, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competitiveness of 
the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW AND POLICY INT’L BUS. 695 (1994); S. Prakash, 
Towards a Synergy Between Biodiversity and Intellectual Property Rights, 2 J. OF 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 821 (1999). 
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2.  The impact of TRIPS on the access to genetic resources 
 
The IPR system construed by TRIPS may affect the genetic 
resources addressed by the CBD. The TRIPS preamble defines IPRs 
as private rights. Because these rights are subject to the general 
WTO principle of national treatment, the implementation of TRIPS 
Article 27.3(b) will give global jurisdiction to private, individual 
property rights. Therefore, the global scope of these rights may 
destabilize the national sovereignty espoused by the CBD, which 
aims to recognize the inherent rights of indigenous and local 
communities.46 Although Article 15.1 of the CBD recognizes “the 
sovereign rights of States over their national resources” and the 
national governments’ ability to determine access to genetic 
resources, the provision does not refer to the question of the 
ownership of these resources. The CBD simply submits access to 
genetic resources to the PIC of the party on mutually agreed terms 
aimed at sharing the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
resources.47  
Not only can firms find genetic resources within the boundaries 
of States, but also in a number of germplasm and seed banks. The 
CBD, dealing with “the ex-situ conservation of components of 
biological diversity,”48 leaves legal issues on the ownership of 
biological resources held in trust in gene banks unanswered. 
Therefore, biopiracy has benefited from a loophole in the legal 
status of materials held by gene banks like the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).49 The 
 
 
46 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 829. Article 3 reads: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
47 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 827–28. 
48 Id. at 826. Ex situ means “outside the place,” i.e. “conservation of a plant 
outside of its original or natural habitat, such as in a gene bank or greenhouse.” 
CGIAR, Future Harvest Center Glossary, http://www.futureharvest.org/about/glossary 
.shtml#e (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). 
49 The CGIAR, established in 1971, is an informal association of fifty-seven 
public and private sector members that supports a network of sixteen international 
agricultural research centers. For a thorough discussion on the controversies raised by 
their interaction with IPRs, see Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Genetic Resources of International Agricultural Research Institutes—Some Recent 
Problems, 1 BIO-SCI. L. REV. 3–11 (1998).  
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International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGRFA)50 is 
progressively trying to close this loophole through the creation of 
the Multilateral System for plant genetic resources. According to 
CBD Article 15.3,51 national authorities should provide for the 
acquisition, conservation, storage, and management of these ex 
situ52 collections.53 Therefore, the CBD does nothing to centralize 
the governance of genetic material stored in gene banks around the 
world. 
From a legal perspective, there is no conflict between the 
affirmation of sovereign rights over States’ genetic resources 
recognized in Articles 3 through 15 of the CBD and the recognition 
of private rights upon the same resources in Article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Under TRIPS the same States as those who 
adopted the CBD have expressly exercised their sovereign rights to 
commit IP protections to inventions based upon their own genetic 
resources in accordance with the stated conditions of patentability. 
Rather, conflicts between the CBD and TRIPS may arise from the 
conditions of patentability of these resources as discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
3.  The impact of TRIPS on the protection of traditional knowledge 
 
Traditional knowledge is the information on genetic resources 
that people in a given community have developed over time. This 
information is based on constantly evolving experiences, adapted to 
local cultures and environments. The community uses traditional 
knowledge to sustain its culture and maintain the biological 
resources necessary for the community’s continued survival.  
Traditional knowledge includes mental inventories of local 
biological resources, animal breeds, local plants, crops, and tree 
species. It may also include such information as which trees and 
 
 
50 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, available at ftp://ext-
ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf 
51 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 828 (article 15.3 states, 
“For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a 
Contracting Party, as referred to in this Article and Articles 16 and 19, are only those 
that are provided by Contracting Parties that are countries of origin of such resources 
or by the Parties that have acquired the genetic resources in accordance with this 
Convention”).  
52 See Id. at 826. 
53 An in-depth analysis of the interaction among the IPRs, the CBD, and the 
ITPGRFA falls outside the scope of the present article. 
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plants grow well together and which plants are indicator plants, 
plants that indicate soil salinity or that flower at the beginning of 
the rains. It also includes practices and technologies such as seed 
treatment, storage methods, and tools used for planting and 
harvesting. Traditional knowledge also encompasses belief systems 
that play a fundamental role in a peoples’ livelihood and in 
maintaining their health and the environment.54  
The term “traditional” implies knowledge “based on traditions” 
and created in a manner that reflects the traditions of the 
community, rather than old or non-technical knowledge. Traditional 
knowledge is therefore easily distinguishable from cosmopolitan 
knowledge, which is drawn from global experience, combining 
“Western” scientific discoveries, economic preferences, and 
philosophies with those of other widespread cultures. 
 
“[W]hat is traditional about traditional knowledge is 
not its antiquity, but the way it is acquired and used. 
In other words, the social process of learning and 
sharing knowledge, which is unique to each 
indigenous culture, lies at the very heart of its 
‘traditionality.’ Much of this knowledge is actually 
quite new, but it has a social meaning, and legal 
character, entirely unlike the knowledge indigenous 
people acquire from settlers and industrialized 
societies.”55 
 
Indeed, traditional knowledge does not relate to the nature of 
the knowledge itself, but to the way in which that knowledge is 
created, preserved, and disseminated. This implies a blend of 
knowledge and experience integrated with a coherent world-view 
 
 
54 In recent years, the international community has placed considerable emphasis 
on traditional knowledge that relates to the environment and the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity, particularly for the maintenance of world food, 
medicinal security, and commercial value to the so-called life industries. However, 
this paper does not restrict traditional knowledge to that concerned only with the 
environment or biodiversity as there are many categories of traditional knowledge that 
have application in many different fields of human interest and endeavour. 
55 R.L. Barsh, Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity, in Indigenous Peoples, 
Their Environments and Territories, in CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES OF 
BIODIVERSITY 73 (D.A. Posey ed., IT Publications and UNEP 1999), quoted in 
GRAHAM DUTFIELD, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE: A 
REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN DIPLOMACY AND POLICY FORMATION 23 (UNCTAD–ICTSD, 
June 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_dutfield.pdf. 
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and value system. Therefore, traditional knowledge is usually 
collective in nature and considered the property of the entire 
community. Because ownership and property rights under the 
common law are foreign to most traditional, knowledge-based 
communities, many conclude that traditional knowledge is res 
nullius—the property of nobody until it is discovered by explorers, 
corporate scientists, governments, and so on. This ignores the fact, 
however, that customary laws recognize forms of ownership 
separate from those designated by IP law.56 Traditional 
communities view traditional knowledge ownership as a 
responsibility rather than as an exclusive property right.  
In the TRIPS Agreement, the categories of IPRs customarily 
recognized do not adequately guarantee the protection of traditional 
knowledge. Traditional knowledge is a fundamental source for the 
sustainable management of biological diversity and for the 
development of new and socially beneficial products through, for 
instance, long-term selective breeding of food crops or knowledge 
of medicinal plants.57 For this reason, the CBD established the 
aforementioned Article 8(j) for the preservation of traditional 
knowledge.  
The conservation of biological resources implies enormous 
responsibilities. TRIPS does not allocate these responsibilities to 
those who will benefit from ownership rights in these resources. 
Instead, TRIPS allocates these responsibilities to IPR holders, 
which only cultivates their monopoly by effectively suspending 
national or community sovereignty over local genetic resources. 
Consequently, governments and communities have little means of 
regulating access or demanding a share of benefits in their own 
genetic resources in which they no longer own the rights. 
The IP protection of the holistic nature of traditional knowledge 
thus appears fraught with various difficulties, and IP laws will only 
marginally satisfy the needs and expectations of traditional 
knowledge holders. Furthermore, because of the anecdotal nature of 
traditional knowledge, governments attempting to incorporate 
 
 
56 See Carlos M. Correa, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues 
and Options Surrounding the Protection of Traditional Knowledge 3 (Quaker United 
Nations Office, Discussion Paper, 2001), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/ 
pdf/economic/Discussion/Traditional-Knowledge-IP-English.pdf (citing STEPHEN 
FISHMAN, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: HOW TO FIND AND USE COPYRIGHT-FREE WRITINGS, 
MUSIC, ART AND MORE 1–3 (Richard Stim & Spencer Sherman eds., Nolo 2000)). 
57 Graham Dutfield, The Public and Private Domains: Intellectual Property 
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 21 SCI. COMM. 276–78 (2000). 
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traditional knowledge in their various natural resource management 
processes generally view it as unreliable. Traditional knowledge is 
hard to qualify as legitimately protected material because it can be 
anything that traditional knowledge holders claim.58  
Although economic interests might not constitute communities’ 
most important or only priority, many communities oppose the 
integration of their inherent rights over traditional knowledge into a 
commercial system.  
 
4.  The impact of TRIPS on the transfer of technology  
 
Whether or not TRIPS will promote the transfer of technology 
is highly controversial. On the one hand, the rigorous 
implementation of the CBD provisions on technology transfers can 
be negatively challenged by the TRIPS regime’s ability to hinder 
the transfer of environmentally sound technology among States or 
develop environmentally harmful technologies. On the other hand, 
TRIPS may also create extraordinary incentive for innovation.59  
An inflexible IP regime without derogations can seriously 
hinder the environmentally sound technology transfer among 
States—particularly from industrialized countries to developing 
ones. Indeed, transfer of appropriate technology is a key tool for 
achieving the goals fixed in the CBD.60 The CBD refers to 
technologies that are “relevant to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do 
not cause significant damage to the environment.”61 The CBD also 
 
 
58 See Albert Howard & Frances Widdowson, Traditional Knowledge Advocates 
Weave a Tangled Web, OPTIONS POLITIQUES, Apr. 1997, at 46–48. 
59 Daniel Alexander, Some Themes in Intellectual Property and the Environment, 
2 REV. OF EURO. COMM. AND INT’L ENVIRON. L. 113, n.2 (1993). See also Riccardo 
Pavoni, Brevettabilità Genetica e Protezione Della Biodiversità: la Giurisprudenza 
Dell'Ufficio Europeo dei Brevetti, 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, FASCICOLO 
429, fasc. 2 at 430–33 (2000). 
60 On the question of transfer of technology, it is important to note the 
compatibility between Article 16 of CBD and the fundamental principle of WTO 
agreements on the Most Favored Nation in Article 3 and 4 of TRIPS. See Richard 
Tarasofsky, The Relationship between TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: Towards a Pragmatic Approach, 6 REV. OF EURO. COMM. AND 
INT’L ENVIRON. L. 148, n.2 at 150 (1997). 
61 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 829. CBD art. 7(c) 
imposes the duty on States to identify “processes and categories of activities which 
have or are likely to have significant adverse impacts on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.” Id. at 825. Such activities have to be 
coherently managed. Id. at 825–26. See Richard Tarasofsky, supra note 60 at 148. 
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requires parties to transfer technology to developing countries on 
“fair and most favorable terms,” including concessional and 
preferential terms to which there is mutual agreement.62 This 
provision means that where a developing country has provided 
access to genetic resources, that country should have facilitated 
access to technology that makes use of those resources. This 
objective needs corresponding national and international IP law, as 
well as a sound competition policy to ensure that IPRs are 
supportive of and do not run counter to the CBD’s objectives.63 
Another possible negative impact of IPR protection of living 
matter lies in the development of environmentally harmful 
technologies. This concern mainly focuses on the technologies 
essentially based on the modification of plant, animal, and 
microorganism genomes with the aim to embody a special 
characteristic. One example is developing herbicide resistance or 
the predisposition to avoid certain diseases in order to attain a 
commercial advantage. Regarding transgenic plants and animals, 
specified environmental risks are particularly harmful to human 
health. These risks can concretize into irreversible harms for the 
global ecosystem and for human welfare after their entry into the 
environment and market. This holds particularly true for 
technologies that produce “terminator seeds,”64 sterile seeds that 
require the application of a chemical “switch” before performing 
certain characteristics like flowering. In this context, national and 
international bodies should more clearly define the patentability 
exceptions under Article 27.2 of TRIPS as they are the only readily 
available defenses against the IP inventions threatening 
biodiversity. 
                                                                                                          
According to this author, although the chapeau of Article 8 uses vague and uncertain 
expressions like “as far as possible” and “as appropriate,” the two regimes of 
protection can be reconciled. 
62 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 829.  
63 Id. On this point, the CBD secretariat has also noted, “Due to the rapid 
development of technologies, particularly biotechnology, further consideration of the 
impacts of intellectual property rights on the achievement of the objectives of the 
Convention, including in facilitating access to and transfer of technology is urgently 
needed.” Note by the Executive Secretary, The Relationship between Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Relevant Provisions of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, ¶ 23, U.N. DOC. UNEP/CBD/ISOC/5 (May 11, 1999).  
64 GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND 
BIODIVERSITY 51–52 (London 2000).  
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One of the main purposes of both the CBD and ITPGRFA is to 
encourage the transfer of technology concerning plant genetic 
resources from biodiversity-recipient to biodiversity-provider 
countries with the view of helping the conservation and sustainable 
use of the same resources.65 As a result, benefit sharing should not 
only denote a form of monetary compensation, but also—if not 
primarily—a form of technology transfer.  
Remarkably, TRIPS contains parallel provisions. Article 66(2) 
provides that “[d]eveloped country Members shall provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the 
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base.” In turn, Article 67 refers to 
“technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing and 
least developed countries.” This technical and financial cooperation 
includes assistance in preparing and administering laws and 
regulations for technology transfers. Additionally, the cooperation 
should help mediate the challenges connecting IP protection and 
biodiversity.66  
These provisions are unsurprising because the WTO did not 
create TRIPS to enhance IP protection but to achieve the aims 
described in Article 7. The Article 7 purposes include “the 
promotion of technological innovation and . . . the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare.”67 The broad goals considered in this 
provision, as well as in TRIPS Article 8, should receive special 
weight when considering issues at the intersection of IP and 
biodiversity. 
Whether or not TRIPS implementation will accomplish the 
promotion of technological innovation to the mutual advantage of 
developing and industrialized countries remains open to question 
 
 
65 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 16, at 827; ITPGRFA arts. 
5.1(e), 7.2(b), 8 and 13.2(b).  
66 For a thoughtful commentary of these two provisions, see N.A. Odman, Using 
TRIPS to Make the Innovation Process Work, 3(3) J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 343 
(2000). 
67 For a “global constitutional” reading of WTO and TRIPS beyond the narrow 
“traditional export interests” that may have shaped it, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO: The TRIPs Agreement and the 
WTO Constitution, 3 INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 32–35 (Th. 
Cottier & Mavroidis eds., 2000). 
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because the granting of patents innately benefits patent holders in 
industrialized countries. Empirical research on this matter is 
inconclusive given the complexity of relations between 
industrialized and developing countries. However, in the field of 
pharmaceutical technology, which depends on genetic resources, 
approximately ten corporations hold 36% of the pharmaceutical 
market, 40% of the seed market, and 82% of the agrochemical 
market.68 In countries that grant overly broad biotechnology patents 
that cover crop species and other categories, IPR holders may raise 
prices, impose restrictive licensing conditions, and limit further 
research, thus undermining their competitors and ultimately 
hindering the diffusion of technology.69 Therefore, the international 
exercise of patent rights promoted by TRIPS has strongly 
contributed to the empowerment of industrialized country patent 
holders over developing countries. 
 
Table 2. Synopsis of the points of conflict between CBD and TRIPS from the 
developing countries standpoint.70 
 
CBD TRIPS The Conflict 
Nation States have 
sovereign public 
rights over their 
biological resources 
(Preamble, Article 
15.1).  
Biological resources 
should be subject to 
private IPRs. 
Compulsory 
licensing, in the 
national interest, 
should be restricted 
(Article 27, Article 
31).  
National sovereignty 
implies that countries 
have the right to 
prohibit IPRs on life 
forms (biological 
resources). TRIPS 
requires the provision 
of IPRs on micro-
organisms, non-
biological and 
microbiological 
processes, as well as 
patents and/or sui 
generis protection on 
plant varieties.  
 
 
 
68 RAFI, The Gene Giants: Mastery of the Universe?, (Mar. 30, 1999), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=180. 
69 See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Oxford ESC Publishing 1989).  
70 This synopsis has been inspired by the one effectuated by GRAIN. For 
convenience, it has been modified to illustrate the relations between the two 
conventions. 
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CBD TRIPS The Conflict 
The use or 
exploitation of 
traditional 
knowledge, 
innovations, and 
practices relevant to 
the use of 
biodiversity must 
give rise to equitably 
shared benefits 
(Preamble, Article 
18.4, Article 8.j).   
States must provide 
patents for all fields 
of technology; 
therefore, IPR must 
protect the use or 
exploitation of 
biological resources. 
There is no 
mechanism for 
sharing benefits 
between a patent 
holder in one country 
and the donor of 
material in another 
country where the 
invention is derived 
(Article 27.1).   
The CBD gives 
developing countries a 
legal basis to demand a 
share of benefits. 
TRIPS does not 
mention such legal 
authority.   
Nation States have 
sovereign public 
rights over their 
biological resources 
(Preamble, Article 
15.1).  
Biological resources 
should be subject to 
private IPRs. 
Compulsory 
licensing, in the 
national interest, 
should be restricted 
(Article 27, Article 
31).  
National sovereignty 
implies that countries 
have the right to 
prohibit IPRs on life 
forms (biological 
resources). TRIPS 
requires the provision 
of IPRs on micro-
organisms, non-
biological and 
microbiological 
processes, as well as 
patents and/or sui 
generis protection on 
plant varieties.  
States should 
promote the 
conservation and 
sustainable use of 
biodiversity as a 
common concern of 
humankind while 
taking into account 
all rights over 
biological resources. 
  
States should 
safeguard public 
health and nutrition 
and public interest in 
general.   
The CBD places the 
public interest and 
common good over 
private property and 
vested interests. TRIPS 
grants private rights on 
the same subject 
matter.   
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IV. THE WTO DEBATE ON THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 27.3(b) OF 
TRIPS FROM DOHA TO HONG KONG 
 
The various arguments of authors, NGO representatives, 
corporate associations, etc., have largely influenced the positions 
held by WTO Member States during the revision process of Article 
27.3(b) in the TRIPS Council. The revision intends to make TRIPS 
more compatible with the CBD obligations. 
Before the Doha Declaration, there were three major options 
under discussion in WIPO and the WTO for the revision of Article 
27.3(b). The majority position advocated the revision of Article 
27.3(b) to exclude life forms altogether from the ambit of TRIPS 
(option I). A variant to this position argued for allowing full 
discretion to the States to exclude any life form from patentability 
(option II). Finally, an intermediate position (option III) supported 
the status quo of the existing text, which became the outcome of 
the negotiations. By remaining with the status quo, patentable 
subject matter neither strengthens nor extends at the multilateral 
level. Accordingly, States continue exploit the present textual 
ambiguities in the implementation process. They also continue to 
utilize bilateral treaties containing stronger IP standards than 
TRIPS requires.71  
 
A. No Patents on Life 
 
The first option reflects the extreme position, which seeks to 
exclude all life forms from the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement 
altogether. In particular, the African countries in the WTO 
proposed amending Article 27.3(b) to clarify that plants, animals, 
micro-organisms, all other living organisms, and their parts cannot 
be patented. The prohibition against patenting parts of plants and 
animals would include protection of genes, gene sequences, cells, 
seeds, etc., which are an integral part of the particular plant or 
 
 
71 Some of these proposals can be found in Relations Entre les Droits de 
Propriété Intellectuelle et les Dispositions Pertinentes de l'Accord sur les Aspects des 
Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle qui Touchent au Commerce et la Convention sur la 
Diversité Biologique, UICN/Réunion Intersessions sur le Fonctionnement de la 
Convention, Montréal, Canada, 28–30 juin 1999, Union Mondiale pour la Nature, 
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/biodiversity1994-1999.htm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2005). 
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animal. A number of other developing countries in the WTO have 
supported this position.72 
 
B. Full Discretion to Exclude Life Forms from Patentability 
 
The second option stopped short of excluding life forms 
from the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement. It used the words “may 
exclude” to denote the discretion of national governments to 
determine the patenting of life issue. Under this formulation, 
WTO Member States will retain the right to exclude 
patentability of plants and animals without the condition of 
providing protection for microorganisms, microbiological 
processes, non-biological processes, and plant varieties.73 
Advocates for this option believe that TRIPS Article 27 should 
incorporate the CBD requirements concerning government 
control over access to genetic resources.74 Proponents of this 
 
 
72 Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, The TRIPS 
Agreement, Aug. 6, 1999, WT/GC/W/302, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W302.DOC [hereinafter Communication from Kenya]; 
Communication from Mauritius on Behalf of the African Group, Review of the 
Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Sept. 20, 2000, IP/C/W/206, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W206.doc [hereinafter Communication 
from Mauritius]. India proposes to exclude patents on all life forms, or at least to 
exclude patents based on traditional/indigenous knowledge and products and processes 
essentially derived from such knowledge. There must be disclosure of the biological 
resource’s country of origin and associated knowledge, and proof of the provider’s 
consent in order to ensure equitable benefit sharing. National policy should decide 
what patentable micro-organisms are in light of Article 27.2 (morality and ordre 
public). Developing countries like India cannot accept any further strengthening of the 
protection presently provided to life forms. Communication from Sri Lanka on behalf 
of the SAARC Member States of the WTO, Joint Statement by the SAARC Commerce 
Ministers on the Forthcoming Third WTO Ministerial Conference (Seattle), Oct. 22, 
1999, WT/L/326, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments 
/t/WT/L/326.DOC. 
73 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.3(b). It has been suggested that since Article 
27.3(b) refers to “plants and animals” and not to any particular class thereof (such as 
“varieties”, “races” or “species”), this reference should be read to include both 
naturally occurring plants and animals and parts thereof, as well as those which have 
been genetically modified (i.e. transgenic). 
74 The African group proposes that the review of TRIPS Art. 27.3 should clarify 
that plants, animals, micro-organisms, and their parts and natural processes cannot be 
patented. TRIPS should contain provisions to promote, not undermine, the 
conservation and sustainable use of genetic material. Finally, TRIPS should contain 
provisions to prevent “biopiracy.” Communication from Kenya, supra note 72; (Aug. 
6, 1999); Communication from Mauritius, supra note 72. Southern Africa 
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measure argued that this would ensure that patent applicants 
would respect source countries’ laws on access, benefit sharing, 
and facilitate protection of traditional knowledge. This revision 
would also prevent abusive patenting of traditional knowledge 
by parties other than the holders of the traditional knowledge. Of 
course, Member States will not accept this option since it 
                                                                                                          
Development Cooperation (SADC) maintains that the exclusion for essentially 
biological processes should extend to microbiological processes. Communication from 
South Africa, SADC Ministers’ Agreed Negotiating Objectives for the Third WTO 
Ministerial Conference, Oct. 1, 1999, WT/L/317, available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/317.doc. Brazil proposes that it should retain the 
flexibility for members to exclude plants and animals. Article 27.3(b) should be 
amended to allow members to require further conditions for patentability through (i) 
identification of source of genetic material, (ii) traditional knowledge used to obtain 
that material, (iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing, and (iv) evidence of 
PIC for the exploitation of the patent. Article 27.3(b) should bear an interpretative note 
clarifying that discoveries or naturally occurring materials are not patentable. 
Communication from Brazil, Review of Article 27.3(b), Nov. 24, 2000, IP/C/W/228, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W228.doc. This is also 
the position of Venezuela, Communication from Venezuela, Proposals Regarding the 
TRIPS Agreement (Paragraph 9(a)(ii) of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration), Aug. 6, 
1999, WT/GC/W/282, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ 
GC/W282.DOC, Zambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe, JOB(99)/3169. The Least Developed Countries Group affirms that there 
should be a formal clarification that naturally-occurring plants and animals, as well as 
their parts (gene sequences) plus essentially biological processes, are not patentable. 
The group also advocates the incorporation of a provision that patents must not be 
granted without PIC of the country of origin. Patents inconsistent with Article 15 of 
the CBD should not be granted. Communication from Bangladesh, The Challenge of 
Integrating LDCs into the Multilateral Trading System, July 13, 1999, WT/GC/W/251, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W251.DOC. Cuba, 
The Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Uganda add that the review should also clarify the 
artificial distinction between biological and microbiological organisms and processes; 
ensure the continuation of traditional farming practices, including the right to save and 
exchange seeds and sell their harvests; and prevent anti-competitive practices that will 
threaten food sovereignty of people in developing countries. Communication from 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, Implementation Issues to be Addressed 
Before/at Seattle, Oct. 11, 1999, WT/GC/W/354, available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W354.DOC; Communication from Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, and Uganda, Implementation Issues to be Addressed in the First Year of 
Negotiations, Oct. 11, 1999, WT/GC/W/355, available at http://docsonline.wto.org 
/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W355.DOC. See also F. Seuret and R. Ali Brac De 
LaPerreire, L'Afrique Refuse le Brevetage du Vivant, 556 LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE 24 
(2000).  
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undermines the very raison d’etre of Article 27.3(b), which is to 
create a minimum protection for biotechnology patent rights. 
 
C.  Maintenance of the Status Quo 
 
European countries,75 the United States,76 and others77 support 
the status quo by relying on the legal grounds that TRIPS and CBD 
do not deal with the same subject matter. More specifically, CBD 
objectives concern the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of genetic resource utilization. 
On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement aims to set minimum 
standards of IP protection within the WTO and ensure that its 
 
 
75 Communication from the European Communities, EC Approach to Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property in the New Round, June 2, 1999, 
WT/GC/W/193, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/ 
W193.DOC [hereinafter Communication from the European Communities]; 
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, Review of 
the Provisions of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, June 13, 2001, IP/C/W/254, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W254.doc. 
76 Communication from the United States, General Council Discussion on 
Mandated Negotiations and the Built-In Agenda, Nov. 19, 1998, WT/GC/W/115, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/W115.DOC; 
Communication from the United States, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b): 
Further Views of the United States, Oct. 3, 2000, IP/C/W/209, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W209.doc. 
77 This is the position of Singapore; TRIPS should not be used to enforce benefit-
sharing arrangements or any common approach to benefit sharing. Communication 
from Japan, Proposal on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, July 6, 1999, 
WT/GC/W/242, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/ 
W242.DOC. Norway adds that some consideration should be made as to whether a 
provision on the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources should be inserted in the 
TRIPS agreement, thus ensuring a more effective implementation of the CBD. 
Communication from Norway, Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement: The 
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, June 29, 2001, IP/C/W/293, available at http://docsonline.wto.org 
/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W293.doc. Switzerland fosters no lowering of protection 
standards and that the exclusion for plants and animals is a balanced provision that 
takes into account members’ needs and interests. Switzerland also agrees with 
Singapore that the UPOV system is a useful reference for the basic level of protection 
of any sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties. Nonetheless, 
Switzerland also agrees that there may be other sui generis systems that meet the 
requirements of Article 27.3(b) besides UPOV and considers the elements listed by the 
U.S. as helpful in drawing up such systems. Communication from Switzerland, Review 
of Article 27.3(b): The View of Switzerland, June 15, 2001, IP/C/W/284, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W284.doc. 
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Member States make judicial and/or administrative enforcement 
procedures available to IPR holders. 
Although the TRIPS Council maintained the status quo, dispute 
continues to brew regarding the impact of patent legislation on 
CBD implementation. Many countries argue that IP is only one of 
the many complicated aspects concerning access to genetic 
resources and benefit sharing. IPRs aim neither to regulate the 
access and use of genetic resources nor to set the terms and 
conditions for bioprospecting and commercialization78 of IPR-
protected goods and services.79 The European Community 
maintains that patent authorities should only examine whether an 
invention meets the criteria applicable to that invention.80 
Alternatively, a majority of countries in the southern hemisphere 
favor arguments developed in international instruments that support 
access to genetic resources through benefit sharing and protection 
of traditional knowledge. Furthermore, they argue that WIPO 
should act as the negotiation forum to facilitate benefit sharing and 
protect sovereign access rights. Accordingly, these countries in the 
southern hemisphere support either a disclosure of origin obligation 
or extended protection of traditional knowledge. 
 
D.  Bilateral Treaties and the Creation of a “TRIPS Plus” 
Regime81 
 
Notwithstanding the numerous concerns raised by TRIPS, 
industrialized countries and transnational corporations consider this 
agreement to be only a minimum standard of protection for IPRs on 
biological resources; they now seek higher standards through 
bilateral negotiations. Indeed, an additional minority position to the 
aforementioned options seeks to include animals and plants among 
 
 
78 Commercialization refers not only to the process of placing products developed 
from the patented invention on the market, but also to the sale and licensing of patents 
themselves.  
79 MARTINE DE KONING, Biodiversity Prospecting and the Equitable 
Remuneration of Ethnobiological Knowledge: Reconciling Industry and Indigenous 
Interests, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF ETHNOBIOLOGY 23–42 (Michael 
Blakeley ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1999). 
80 See Second Report of the European Community to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: Thematic Report on Access and Benefit-Sharing, (Oct. 2002). 
See generally Communication from the European Communities, supra note 76.  
81 For a more in-depth study on this matter, see Peter Drahos, Bilateralism in 
Intellectual Property, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/ 
biltateralism_ip.rtf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).  
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the patentability subject matter and to impose the UPOV 
Convention as the “effective sui generis protection” for plant 
varieties, as Article 27 TRIPS mandates. This position was likely 
the unspoken ideal of the U.S. and many EU countries. In the face 
of the impossibility of achieving these objectives through a 
multilateral approach, industrialized countries have embarked on 
bilateral negotiation alternatives with developing countries. In 
order to achieve much stronger standards of protection, 
industrialized countries are negotiating a range of bilateral, 
regional, and sub-regional agreements with individual Southern 
countries’ governments under the mantra of “national treatment” 
and “most-favored-nation” principles. This practice may soon make 
TRIPS obsolete82 as the thick network of obligations among WTO 
Member States combine to achieve a “TRIPS plus agreement,” 
ultimately providing heightened protections for industrialized 
countries. Thus, the rights of the IPR holder will have priority over 
developing countries as users of IP-protected works.  
This applies to IPRs dealing with life forms. For instance, one 
of the biggest novelties introduced by these bilateral agreements is 
the requirement to provide patent protection on plants and animals. 
This is true for Jordan,83 Mongolia,84 Nicaragua, Sri Lanka,85 and 
Vietnam.86 Under another approach, South Africa and the seventy-
 
 
82 “Using the TRIPS-plus criteria described above, and looking at only a portion 
of these agreements, GRAIN has, in 2001, identified 23 cases of bilateral or regional 
treaties between developed and developing countries that should be classed as TRIPS-
plus as far as IPR on life forms are concerned. These agreements affect more than 150 
developing countries. This means that something serious is occurring; the TRIPS-plus 
features of these treaties cannot be accidental.” “Trips-Plus” Through the Back Door: 
How Bilateral Treaties Impose Much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO, 
GRAIN PUBLICATIONS, July 2001, http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=6 [hereinafter 
Trips-Plus]. 
83 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, DOS 
No. 02–11, CONSOLIDATED TREATIES AND INT’L AGREEMENTS, 2002, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/Section_Index.html?ht=jorda
n%20jordan [hereinafter Jordan Agreement]. 
84 Treaty Between the United States of America and Mongolia Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Mong., Oct. 6, 1994, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43579.pdf. 
85 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Sri Lanka, Sep. 20, 1991, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/43588.pdf.  
86 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S.-Vietnam, July 13, 2000, http://www.ustr. 
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eight African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries are supposed to 
grant patents on “biotechnological” inventions,87 thereby protecting 
plants, animals, and microorganisms as required by TRIPS. 
In the field of microorganisms, TRIPS does not advocate the 
heightened standard of the Budapest Treaty system for patent 
protection of microorganisms; however, through bilateral treaties, 
countries have still entered into this more sophisticated 
administrative standard. Under bilateral agreements with industrial 
countries, at least Korea,88 Mexico,89 Morocco, and Tunisia90 have 
been required to join the Budapest system, while Jordan and other 
countries must implement their own substantive provisions.91 These 
obligations go beyond TRIPS standards because the Budapest treaty 
obliges parties to recognize the physical deposit of microorganism 
samples with an international depository authority instead of full 
written disclosure of the invention.92 Under this treaty, a deposit 
fulfills the requirement for disclosure. Furthermore, this treaty, 
whose contracting parties are mostly industrialized states, relies on 
a network of recognized international depository authorities, which 
operate special rules on access to the biological samples in order to 
avert potential patent infringement. 
                                                                                                          
gov/assets/World_Regions/Southeast_Asia_Pacific/Vietnam/asset_upload_file804_51
01.pdf. 
87 Partnership Agreement Between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and 
the European Community and its Member States, June, 23 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3, 
24, available at http://www.grain.org/brl_files/acp-eu-partnership-agreement-2000 
.pdf; Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation Between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of South Africa, 
of the Other Part, Apr. 12, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 3, 17–18, available at 
http://www.grain.org/brl_files/south-africa-eu-trips-plus.pdf. 
88 Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights art. B(6), U.S.-Korea, 
Aug. 28, 1986, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=388. 
89 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement 
Between the European Community and its Member States, of the One Part, and the 
United Mexican States, of the Other Part, Oct. 28, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 276) 45. 
90 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of 
Tunisia, of the Other Part, Mar. 30, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 97) 2.  
91 Jordan Agreement, supra note 83, at 4.  
92 “Where an invention involves a microorganism or the use of a microorganism, 
disclosure is not possible in writing but can only be [affected] by the deposit, with a 
specialized institution, of a sample of the microorganism.” WIPO, Summary of the 
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms 
for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (1977), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
registration/budapest/summary_budapest.html. 
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Bilateral treaties increasingly put pressure on developing 
countries to heighten standards. For example, a substantive 
provision may require that developing countries implement IPRs 
“in accordance with the highest international standards.”93 Such 
ambiguous and lofty standards open the door to new standards 
generated through investment treaties. This kind of agreement 
represents only the tip of the iceberg of unrelenting pressure to 
patent plants and animals. Indeed, the TRIPS-plus phenomenon that 
once quietly brewed away in the corner has now become rampant.94 
In a bilateral free-trade agreement text, that has not been made 
public yet, it is reported that the United States for the first time 
agreed to language relating to traditional knowledge, according to a 
Peruvian government source: “the language, which appears in a 
side letter to the overall agreement, apparently stresses the 
importance of such practices as informed consent, benefit-sharing, 
and utilization of contracts with the aim of encouraging the 
protection of biodiversity.” The agreement facilitates the access by 
U.S. patent applicants to a database to find eventual evidence of 
prior art in the form of traditional knowledge related to a genetic 
resource.95 
 
E. The Debate within the TRIPS Council: 
The Road to Hong Kong 
 
In review of Article 27.3(b), the WTO Ministerial Conference 
instructed the TRIPS Council “to examine, inter alia, the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and 
folklore, and other relevant developments raised by members 
pursuant to Article 71.1.”96 
Many countries consider this an important step towards the 
reconciliation between TRIPS and the CBD provisions. 
Additionally, the TRIPS-plus effect rendered obsolete developing 
 
 
93 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation 
Between the European Community, of the One Part, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, of the Other Part, July 16, 1997, 1997 O.J. (L 187) 3. 
94 See Trips-Plus, supra note 82.  
95 Martin Vaughan, US-Peru Deal Includes First-Ever Traditional Knowledge 
Provisions, Sept. 12, 2005, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=173& res=1024&print=0. 
96 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 31, at 751. 
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countries’ appeals to revise Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement to ban the patentability of life forms. Because most 
developing countries accepted heightened standards and the 
patenting of living organisms through bilateral trade agreements 
with industrialized countries, little conflict remains regarding 
Article 27.3(b). 
As a result, the current controversy within the TRIPS Council 
focuses less on the morality of patenting life and more on the 
integration of benefit-sharing obligations arising from the IP 
exploitation of genetic resources mentioned in Article 27. More 
particularly, developing countries now demand a new patentability 
requirement: the disclosure of origin as evidence of PIC and benefit 
sharing. Thus, the road to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 
2006 is fraught with more technical issues than moral ones. 
Most agree that the vast majority of genetic resources exist in 
the global South where little possibility of exploitation exists. A 
large block of developing countries led by India and Brazil argue 
that the industrialized world’s practice of exploiting their resources 
without equitably sharing the benefits is the equivalent of 
“biopiracy.”97 Therefore, the Brazil-India coalition has called for 
augmented criteria to patent an invention. The current TRIPS 
regime requires an invention to meet three criteria before issuing a 
patent: novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. The Brazil-India 
coalition is currently pushing for the addition of a fourth 
requirement: proof of PIC. Firms would prove PIC by disclosing 
the source and origin country of the genetic resources used to make 
the invention. This added disclosure requirement, developing 
countries argue, will ensure the equitable sharing of benefits and 
prevent the erroneous issuance of patents.98  
While ensuring equitable sharing of benefits and preventing the 
erroneous issuance of patents are undoubtedly desirable objectives, 
the United States argues that the introduction of new patent 
disclosure requirements will not achieve these desirable objectives. 
They further argue that the proposed requirement may actually have 
significant negative social and economic consequences. The U.S. 
 
 
97 See generally Submission from Brazil and India, The Relationship Between the 
TRIPS agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Technical Observations on Issues Raised in a 
Communication by the United States (IP/C/W/434), 18 March 2005, IP/C/W/443, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W443.doc [hereinafter 
Technical Observation]. 
98 Id. ¶ 3.  
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proposes an alternative solution; it calls for tailored, national 
solutions to meet practical concerns and actual needs.99 In other 
words, the U.S. calls for the status quo and supports the 
strengthening of nationally administered and enforced contractual 
arrangements, as already promoted under the Bonn Guidelines and 
mandated under the CBD. The U.S. claims this as the most 
effective manner to achieve the CBD objectives for several 
reasons.100  
First, the U.S. holds that new patent disclosure requirements 
cannot guarantee that industrialized countries will obtain PIC 
before they issue patents, and thus the new requirements will not 
prevent misappropriation. According to the U.S., “it is the relevant 
PIC agreement itself (usually constituting a contract between two 
entities), and not disclosure in a patent application, that manifests 
prior informed consent.”101 If the goal is to ensure authorized access 
based on PIC, “only contractual obligations that establish the rights 
and obligations of the entities involved prior to any access to 
genetic resources can ensure prior informed consent is achieved.”102 
From this point of view, what all countries need, more than an 
adjustment in the international patent system, is a clearer 
delineation of the contractual guidelines for acquiring authorization 
to exploit genetic resources at the national and local levels. This 
would facilitate the proliferation of contractual agreements on 
benefit sharing.   
Second, the U.S. declares that patent offices have insufficient 
resources and capability to examine documentation regarding 
source and origin, PIC, or equitable benefit sharing. Thus, new 
patent disclosure requirements would place overpowering 
administrative burdens on national patent offices. The necessary 
training and additional resources needed to prepare for such work 
would be very costly.103 Even with these added resources, the U.S. 
doubts that patent examiners could make legally certain 
determinations regarding such documentation, particularly when 
those decisions involve interpreting foreign laws. Accordingly, the 
U.S. maintains that strengthening national mechanisms for 
 
 
99 See Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship 
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, ¶ 6, IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 26, 2004). 
100 Id. ¶ 4.  
101 Id. ¶¶ 7, 18–32. 
102 Id. ¶ 7. 
103 Id. ¶ 15. 
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developing and enforcing contractual arrangements between 
bioprospecting entities and “owners” of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge would do much more to prevent erroneous 
patents and would do so without unnecessarily burdening patent 
offices.   
Third, the U.S. believes a new disclosure requirement in the 
patent system would not ensure that industrialized countries 
equitably share benefits with the providers of traditional knowledge 
or genetic resources.104 If the country of origin in question has no 
benefit-sharing infrastructure, disclosure would “convey the 
information requested but would have no mechanism to transfer 
benefits between parties.”105 The U.S. indicates that the real 
problem is the general lack of benefit-sharing infrastructures in 
developing provider countries rather than an inadequate 
international patent system.  
Finally, the U.S. argues that new patent disclosure requirements 
would add new uncertainties to the patent system and thereby 
decrease investment in important drugs.106 This position relies upon 
the interests of the economic forces in this field. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend large sums of money on the research and 
development of new drugs—those companies then rely on the 
monopoly rights patent grants to recover their expenditures. Thus, 
patents promote the public good by providing incentives to 
innovate.  
The question then becomes whether the WTO should amend the 
TRIPS Agreement as proposed by the Brazil-India camp? The 
proposed recommendation would still allow any State the right to 
litigate over patent rights for biotechnological and pharmaceutical 
goods developed from their country’s resources. The fear of losing 
a patent through litigation would act as an ex-ante tax on 
pharmaceutical investment. Proponents of the U.S.’s point of view 
refer to a recent study by Timothy A. Wolfe and Benjamin Zycher 
of the Pacific Research Institute. This study estimated that the 
aforementioned uncertainty would reduce biotechnological and 
pharmaceutical research and development by almost twenty-seven 
 
 
104 Id. ¶ 9. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. ¶ 14.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW           VOLUME 2 
 
 38
percent before 2025. The reduction would result in the loss of 150 
to 200 new drugs, and cost a cumulative $100.6 billion.107   
The Brazil-India camp argues, however, that the U.S. “has not 
made a sufficient case against the proposed disclosure 
requirement.”108 From their point of view, the development of 
effective national laws that address the goals of transparent patent 
applications through PIC and access and benefit sharing (ABS) are 
necessary steps in achieving the goals of the CBD. They assert, 
however, that this “does not in anyway provide a basis for rejecting 
the establishment of an international system to support and 
facilitate the implementation of national systems.”109 The Brazil-
India camp argues that both the PIC and ABS institutions are 
critical to achieving an equitable result between the right-holders 
and -users and the provider country and recipients. They maintain 
that they should be integrated into TRIPS Article 27.   
Rebutting the U.S.’s argument that patent disclosure 
requirements can neither ensure PIC nor prevent misappropriation, 
Brazil and India claim that a national system alone cannot achieve 
this either. The proposed international system, they point out, was 
never intended to be a stand-alone system, but a “vital measure and 
incentive that would support and ensure the effective operation of 
national regimes for prior informed consent.”110 Contractual 
arrangements and similar mechanisms must be enforceable across 
borders, and the current fragmented national system does not 
achieve enforceability. 
Brazil and India respond in a similar vein to the U.S.’s claim 
that disclosure cannot ensure benefit sharing. Again, they argue that 
national systems of the contractual brand are necessary but 
insufficient alone. International obligations coupled with relevant 
national regimes would affect the transfer of benefits.111   
The Brazil-India coalition, however, disagrees with the U.S.’s 
claim that the proposed changes would overburden patent offices. 
The coalition asserts that the disclosure requirement in question 
does not differ from the other disclosure requirements common to 
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domestic legal systems (i.e. disclosure of information material to 
patentability requirements in the U.S.). Therefore, the disclosure 
requirement should not impose any excessive administrative 
burdens on patent offices or applicants. As for the U.S.’s doubt 
regarding patent examiners’ ability to determine the validity of PIC 
and ABS, Brazil and India insist that the disclosure requirement 
will not require patent examiners to determine such validity. “The 
role of the patent examiner,” they claim, “will be limited to 
confirming that the patent application contains a declaration in the 
prescribed form indicating that PIC was obtained and that benefits 
were shared and/or that there exists an arrangement for future 
benefit-sharing in accordance with the relevant national law.”112    
Finally, Brazil and India disagree that the changes would add 
uncertainty to the international patent system. They believe that 
rather than taking it away, “the proposed disclosure requirement 
would in fact introduce much needed certainty … by establishing 
clear internationally agreed rules on disclosure, prior informed 
consent, and benefit-sharing.”113 They add that the requirement 
would preserve the balance of the patent system by recognizing that 
States and local communities contribute to innovation by providing 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge.  
The validity of the Wolfe and Zycher analysis on the negative 
effects of a “patent-destroying ABS regime” is difficult to assess. 
The circumstances may vary with the creation of a new 
environment of cooperation in the biological resource exchange. 
One can also counter the U.S.’s arguments by noting that new ABS 
laws would build trust between provider communities and industrial 
bioprospectors. This may explain why no other WTO member 
supports the extreme position of the U.S.’s proposal even though it 
claims to offer a “superior way” of achieving the CBD objectives 
while retaining the purity of the international IP system. The patent 
system is not clinically isolated from other non-IP issues. However, 
the developing world would be wise to consider the U.S.’s 
recommendation to develop systems of benefit sharing outside the 
patent system. By creating a cooperative system to share the 
benefits flowing from biotech patent rights, the patent system will 
acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the public in developing countries. 
However, the main purpose of this article is to introduce the 
international legal debate on the solutions de lege ferenda in Article 
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27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, solutions in this regard fall 
outside the scope of this article. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIVE OPINIONS 
 
The first conclusive observation about Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement is that it opened up new commercial opportunities 
through IP protection of biotechnology in all countries. In spite of 
its incomplete construction and inherent vagueness, it has powerful 
implications in the context of international commerce based on 
biological resources. These implications have started a massive, 
controversial campaign, mainly organized by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and indigenous communities in developing 
countries, to wrest market control over biodiversity through the 
patent system and to change the system’s rules.114 Companies in 
industrialized countries with sophisticated technologies—such as 
genetic engineering—that extract value from biodiversity by 
patenting new genetic “inventions” have aggravated the 
controversy. However, many of these genetic “inventions” claimed 
in the North have come primarily from traditional knowledge and 
genetic resource misappropriations in the South. Through patent 
protection on life forms, major transnational corporations can take 
genes from, for instance, a weed in the fields, forests, or coastal 
waters of developing countries without PIC from provider States.115 
A transnational corporation can then manipulate this weed in its 
labs and obtain patent protection for its “new” discovery. 
Consequently, the mere transformation of resources in the 
laboratories of industrialized countries has resulted in a public 
outcry from developing countries because corporations are paid 
royalties based on the developing countries’ preserved resources 
and traditional knowledge.  
The second observation is that contracting parties to both 
TRIPS and the CBD encounter hurdles implementing both treaties 
in national legislation. Because TRIPS only recognizes a patent in 
the case of novelty, industrial application, and non-obviousness, 
and the CBD provides pre-existing rights to genetic resources and 
related traditional knowledge, there is a definite conflict in dual 
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implementation. Contrary to TRIPS, national laws implementing 
the CBD principles must assign the rights of pre-existing genetic 
resources to local communities or the States. The international 
exercise of IPRs on biodiversity-related “inventions” becomes 
dependent upon the prior “rights” of these local and indigenous 
communities.  
Finally, in light of this debate, some considerations and 
opinions need to be stated. Although to the Brazil-India coalition 
the TRIPS Agreement seems like the right treaty to achieve 
reconciliation between the CBD and international patent law, these 
countries must not forget that they can achieve similar results by 
amending other patent treaties administered by WIPO. There are 
serious doubts that the WTO will amend TRIPS to reconcile it with 
conflicting CBD concepts in the near future. Diplomats and IP 
policy makers may realize that TRIPS is not the right treaty to 
reconcile these differences in the most thorough and rapid manner 
given the opposition by WTO Member States. 
Member States hardly expect a revision of TRIPS Article 27 as 
an outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference unless other 
WTO agreements come into the bargaining. Under such 
circumstances, agreements for agriculture or services may increase 
the bargaining margin and maneuvering of certain States, which 
may play a part in the revision of Article 27. As things stand, it 
would be highly unlikely to expect industrialized countries to give 
up tariffs and subsidies on agricultural production while burdening 
their patent system with new CBD-compliant requirements such as 
PIC and benefit sharing.  
Policy makers in industrialized countries know that empirical 
data supports the fact that patents, no matter how imperfect the 
granting system, are indeed a necessary tool for innovation. For 
example, the U.S.’s Bayh Dole Act allowed universities to retain 
profits flowing from the exercise of patent rights, which resulted in 
an increase in the number of patent applications by encouraging 
inventiveness.116 Hence, radically modifying the current patent 
system in the field of biotechnological innovations by introducing a 
burdensome system of CBD-compatible benefit sharing in Article 
27 may seriously impede the investment flows to biotechnological 
start-up companies. As seen from the Bayh Dole Act, most 
industrialized countries prefer to remove as many burdens as 
possible in order to keep the patent system as neutral and free 
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flowing as possible. Other treaties administered by WIPO are more 
appropriate for a rapid reconciliation between patent law and the 
CBD principles. For example, the international community could 
introduce transparency measures, such a certificate of origin for 
genetic resources on which the patentable invention is based and 
requiring such certificates for patent applications under the Patent 
Corporation Treaty and Substantive Patent Law Treaty.117  
The complexities inherent to the patentability of biological 
material may persuade WTO Member States to introduce a higher 
threshold than what currently occurs in Europe and the United 
States. Moreover, U.S. patent law is currently watering down 
patentability requirements, leaving all controversial matters to the 
scrutiny of courts. Consequently, court proceedings are very 
complex and the international system follows these proceedings in 
alleged cases of international misappropriation. 
This analysis has been inherently limited to the IP aspects of 
the important instrument of transparency in patent application. It is 
apparent that this is just one of many potential measures that 
countries may consider to facilitate the convergence between CBD 
objectives and the exercise of IPRs. In fact, the CBD realizes most 
of its objectives when countries act outside the IP system because 
many products on the market rely on genetic resources accessed 
and bioprospected without patents.  
Clearly, the legal tensions between TRIPS and the CBD are the 
source of much debate. In this debate, players must exercise 
extreme caution when dealing with the delicate question of 
monopolized private ownership of the building blocks of life. In 
case WTO Members, also contracting parties to the CBD, do not 
reach an international level agreement, the PIC, and access and 
benefit sharing institutions will still bind them when implementing 
national patent legislation, thus rendering the patent system more 
fair and equitable.  
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